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Abstract
A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy com-
mitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We drop such
assumption and we show that costless electoral campaign can be an ef-
fective way of transmitting information to voters. The result is robust to
relevant equilibrium reﬁnements. An unavoidable proportion of ambigu-
ous politicians emerges, consistently with empirical ﬁndings.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is commonplace to say that electoral promises cannot be taken at face value.
However parties and candidates invest a considerable amount of eﬀort and re-
sources in producing electoral messages. Presumably electoral campaign is be-
lieved to be a credible mean to attract voters’ support. But if campaigns are a
mere act of promising why should they inﬂuence citizens?
Intuitively campaigns convey information useful to predict future policies. So
future policies should be predictable from present ones. Otherwise the elec-
toral process could not accomplish its very objective of selecting and retaining
politicians according to electors’ views. Electoral campaigns, in order to be
meaningful, must alter electors’ beliefs about the policies the elected oﬃcials
will implement. A widely employed explanation is that politicians and elected
oﬃcials seek reelection. Electoral promises aﬀect voters’ expectations about the
policies that will be chosen and provide a benchmark linking promises, poli-
cies and reelection (retrospective voting), because a credible threat to reelection
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1is imposed (see Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986) and Austen-Smith and Banks
(1989)).
But the disciplining role of electoral competition is only one face of the coin.
Actually I will prove that electoral promises provide also a solution to the infor-
mational asymmetries between candidates and politicians. The diﬃculty arises
because campaigns are cheap talk: when electoral messages alone are changed
no agent’s payoﬀ diﬀers.
Downs (1957) himself underlies the importance of the relationship between
preelection statements and post-election behavior for rational voting being mean-
ingful.
Now we try to prove that a party’s ideology must be consistent
with either (1) its actions in prior election periods, or (2) its state-
ments in the preceding campaign (including its ideology), or (3)
both... A party is reliable if its policy statements at the beginning
of an election period-including those in its preëlection campaign-can
be used to make accurate predictions of its behavior... A party is
responsible if its policies in one period are consistent with its ac-
tions (or statements in the preceding period),... (103-105)... The
absence of reliability means that voters cannot predict the behavior
of parties from what the parties say the will do. The absence of
responsibility means party behavior cannot be predicted by consis-
tently projecting what parties have done previously...We conclude
that reliability is a logical necessity in any rational election system,
and that responsibility-though not logically necessary-is strongly im-
plied by rationality as we deﬁne it. Of course this conclusion does not
prove that reliability and responsibility actually exist in our model.
We can demonstrate that they do-and therefore that our model is
rational-only by showing that political parties are inexorably driven
by their own motives to be both reliable and responsible...(105-107).
In our model it is necessary for each party’s ideology to bear a con-
sistent relation to its actions.... Any other procedure makes rational
voting nearly impossible...(113)
But most of the classical models of electoral competitions like the Hotelling-
Downs one assume that politicians are committed to their electoral engagements.
The questions about the credibility of campaign promises are left unanswered.
Building on Downs’ intuition the paper provides an explanation based both
on informational asymmetries and dynamic aspects, in our case career concerns.
Each one of the argument alone is not able to provide a satisfactory solution.
The diﬃculty which arises is that campaigns are cheap talk: when electoral
messages alone are changed no agent’s payoﬀ diﬀers. Under complete informa-
tion politicians cannot credibly commit to policies diﬀerent than their favorite
ones unless elections are inﬁnitely repeated (Alesina (1988)). The result can
be relaxed only allowing for indiﬀerence in voters’ preferences (Aragonés et al
2(2005))1. With the prospect of a unique election, costless electoral campaign
cannot be meaningful (Harrington (1992a)) unless one drops the assumption of
full policy enforceability (Harrington (1992b))2.
The paper which is closest to our approach is Harrington (1993a). He presents
am o d e lo fﬁnitely (twice) repeated elections under incomplete information un-
der bilateral asymmetric information. Elected oﬃcials can choose between two
policies. Candidates’ and voters’ types are the policies they think to be the
most beneﬁcial on income. The type space is ﬁnite and beliefs are not consis-
tent with the common prior assumption. While voters’ only care about their
income, candidates’ preferences are lexicographic: they ﬁrst care about holding
the oﬃce and then about the policy they implement. In this case each politi-
cian prefers to implement the policy she beliefs the most eﬀective. The author
proves that there exist equilibria in which each candidate truthfully announces
and implements her favorite policy.
This paper presents a model in which candidates’ care both about oﬃce and
about the policy they would implement if elected. Politicians’ and voters’ prefer-
ences are private information. But diﬀerently from Harrington (1993b) the type
space is continuous and beliefs are derived from a common prior. The distribu-
tions of agents’ preferences is symmetric with respect to the origin. Candidates’
compete for election by announcing a particular policy. The campaign an-
nouncement is totally costless. The winning candidate implements a policy and
runs for reelection against a randomly chosen opponent. We focus on symmet-
ric and monotonic equilibria in which more centrist politicians are elected with
higher probabilities and implement more centrist policies. Monotonic equilibria
permit to rule out very unlikely behaviors where extremists present themselves
as centrist, while moderates make an extremist campaign, and have an intuitive
appeal. Furthermore we show that in all non-monotonic equilibrium electoral
campaign is meaningful. To reﬁne out-of-equilibrium beliefs with regard to to-
tally unexpected policies. we use a reﬁnement introduced by Bernheim and
Severinov (2003) (see also Kartik (2005)) The reﬁnement, called monotonic D1
Criterion adapts to monotonic environments the D1 criterion (Cho and Kreps
(1987)). We characterize the set of these equilibria for any degree of candidates’
policy implication. , where incumbents’ motives are mainly reelection. Innovat-
ing on Harrington (1993a) we ﬁnd that not only reelection pressures but also
policy motivations can give relevance to electoral promises. Necessary condi-
tions for informative campaign are a suﬃciently high degree of policy concern on
candidates’ side and the ability of the electorate to credibly threaten the incum-
bent about her reelection perspectives. Candidates suﬀer the tension between
pleasing their constituencies and seeking the reelection. The cost of ambiguity
is to implement policies that are faraway from candidate’s favorite one. So ex-
tremists are less willing to fully pay it. But they do pay a price, even when they
1The authors themselves admit that this approach does not seems a "compelling expla-
nation because of how campaign promises can have eﬀect since it rests on the existence of a
nontrivial set of indiﬀerent voters".
2Costly electoral campaign can be relevant (Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie
(2005)).
3fully reveal their preferences. It is because they are forced to please the cen-
trist electorate in order to enhance their election chances3. Centrist candidates
prefer to be ambiguous in order to increase their election perspectives. They
act as pure oﬃce-seekers. Reliability as commitment to the electoral promises
of pert of the politicians emerges endogenously. In the same way responsibility
appears, present policies can be useful proxies to predict future ones. Relaxing
the reﬁnement criterion other equilibria with relevant campaign emerge. But
ambiguous, or dishonest behavior cannot be eliminated, independently on the
equilibrium reﬁnement used. There will be always politicians who act only to
maximize their probability of reelection. Their share can only be reduced by
an high degree of policy concern, which increases the costs of implementing a
centrist policy. The ambiguity of centrist politicians captures a feature that
Harrington (1993a) was not able to account for: the partial, even if relevant
responsiveness of policies to electoral announcements found by empirical work
(see Harrington (1992a) and (1992b)). The result also connects with the debate
on the nature of political center. It is compatible with the vision of a political
center lacking of a well deﬁned ideology and better deﬁned by its opportunistic
behavior, which is quite popular between the general public (see Hazan (1997)).
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we describe agents’
behavior and we introduce the characteristics of electoral competition. and
equilibrium. In Section 3 we present some preliminary results on electoral equi-
librium that clarify our choices and we prove the impossibility of fully honest
behavior. Section 4 introduces the equilibrium reﬁnement that we will use in
Section 5 to characterize a relevant set of equilibria. Finally Section 6 will
draw the conclusion and possible directions of future research in the ﬁeld. An
Appendix contains the proofs of the results that are not included in the main
text.
2 The Model
Candidates’ and voters’ preferences are private knowledge. Candidates compete
for oﬃce by making campaign announcements. The winner chooses a policy
taking in account reelection perspectives. There are two elections. The policy
space is P =[ −D,D],w h e r eD>0.T h e r ea r et w ocandidates: R(ight) and
L(eft). Candidates policy intentions (or types) are assumed to be independent
and symmetric random variables. Candidate R type, αR ∈ [0,D] is drawn from
the cdf FR(·) with continuos density, fR(·)=F0
R(·).w h e r efR(α) > 0 if and only
if α ∈ [0,D]. Candidate L’s policy intentions have symmetric density, fL(αL)=
fR(−αL) for all αL ∈ PL =[ −D,0].L e t PR =[ 0 ,D] and PL =[ −D,0] be
candidate R and candidate L policy space, respectively.
Then ER(x)=
D Z
0
αf(α)dα = −
0 Z
−D
αf(−α)dα = EL(x) and ER(x2)=
3The symmetry assumptions on the distribution of preferences imply that the mass of
voters is concentrated in the origin, in the case of an unimodal distribution.
4D Z
0
α2f(α)dα =
0 Z
−0
α2f(−α)dα = EL(x2).
Set E(x)=ER(x) > 0 and set E(x2)=ER(x2) > 0.
In the campaign stage each candidate j = L,R c a ns e n dam e s s a g em ∈
Pj. Based on campaign announcements (mR,m L) e a c hv o t e rc a s t sh e rv o t e
for one of the candidate. We assume that there are n electors, where n ∈ N
is odd and publicly known. Once in oﬃce, the winning candidate implements
a policy from her policy space, simultaneously a challenger is selected from
the original distribution. Each voter observe incumbent’s policy choice and,
taking in account her policy announcement casts a vote to conﬁrm or to ﬁre
her. Challenger’s policy intentions are drawn from the original distribution
FL
4.
A voter of type v ∈ [−D,D] has preferences represented by the following utility
function, V (s,v)=−(α − s)2.
At each election, independently across time, a median voter, mv is drawn from
a symmetric distribution G on [−D,D] with continuos density, g(·)=G0(·).T h e
assumption is equivalent to have a known median voter in 0 with a symmetric
unknown idiosyncratic bias (see Austen-Smith and Banks (2005)).
Candidate α’s utility from winning the election is, at each period
U(s,α)=y − k(α − s)2
where s is the implemented policy and y>0 is the values she assigns to the
oﬃce. k>0, measures candidate’s degree of policy implication.Ad e f e a t e d
candidate gets 0 utility5
Let πi be the probability candidate R wins the election i,f o ri =1 ,2.I f a n
incumbent is conﬁrmed there is not another election to present to so she will
implement her favorite policy. From implementing policy sR ∈ PR a candidate
of type α ∈ [0,D] will derive utility
UR(π1,π2,s 1,s,α)=π1
£
y − k(α − sR)2 + π2δy
¤
where δ ∈ (0,1) is her intertemporal factor discount. At the ﬁrst period can-
didate R is free to make a policy announcement on M ⊂ [0,D]. Candidate
L’s. Preferences are deﬁned symmetrically, with the same intertemporal factor
discount, δ and candidate degree of policy implication.
2.1 Voters’ behavior
Let mv be the median voter. Let µ be her beliefs about candidates’ pol-
icy preferences She votes for candidate R if and only if E
£
(mv − αR)2 | µ
¤
<
4From Harrington (1992a and b) it follows that any campaign stage before the last election
is irrelevant.
5The results can straightforwardly be generalized to the case in which candidates care also
about the policy of their opponent.
5E
£
(mv − αL)2 | µ
¤
which is if and only if mv >e (µ) where
e(µ)=
1
2
E
£
α2
R | µ
¤
− E
£
α2
L | µ
¤
E [αR | µ] − E [αL | µ]
is the decisive median voter.
Then R is elected with probability π(µ)=1− G(e(µ)) = 1
2 + G(−e(µ)) given
G symmetry.
Remark 1 If a type α>0 is matched against a challenger randomly drawn
from FL her decisive median voter is
e(α,,f (·)) =
1
2
α2 −
R D
0 β
2f (β)dβ
α +
R D
0 βf (β)dβ
We will denote by π ((α,,f (·))) her probability of election. If types in (α1,α 2)
pool together their decisive median voter is
e([α1,α 2],f(·)) =
1
2
R α2
α1 β
2f (β)dβ − (F(α2) − F(α1)
R D
0 β
2f (β)dβ
R α2
α1 βf (β)dβ +( F(α2) − F(α1)
R D
0 βf (β)dβ
We will denote by π((α1,α 2,,f(·))) their probability of election. Using el-
ementary Analysis it can be shown that e(α3,,f(·)) >e ([α1,α 2],f(·)) >
e(α0,f(·)) if α3 >α 2 >α 1 >α 0 > 0. e(α,,f (·)) is strictly increasing
in α. e([α1,α 2],f(·)) is strictly decreasing in α1,α 2 (separately). Finally
limα1→α
−
2 e([α1,α 2],f(·)) = e(α2,f(·)) and limα2→α
+
1 e([α1,α 2],f(·)) = e(α1,f(·)).
2.2 Electoral Equilibrium
A campaign strategy for candidate j = R,L is a function mj : Pj → Pj.A
campaign strategy is a “cheap talk” announcement of a policy by candidate j.
If elected, candidate j has to choose a policy sin Pj.A policy strategy for
incumbent j is a function sj : P2
j × Pk → Pj, j 6= k.
A voting strategy is a 4-uple (r1j,r 2j)j=R,L where r1j : PR × PL × P → ©
0, 1
2,1
ª
, r1R +r2L =1and r2j : PR ×PL ×Pj ×P →
©
0, 1
2,1
ª
. r1j(mR,mL,x)
represents the probability the median voter votes for candidate j at the ﬁrst
election, when she is of type x and has observed electoral messages (mR,mL).
If j results elected after campaign messages (mR,mL) r2j(mR,mL,s j,x) is the
probability the median voter conﬁrms her in the oﬃce when she implements
policy sj.
Remark 2 As each incumbent is opposed to a randomly chosen challenger there
is no loss of generality in consider policy strategies independent from the other
candidate campaign message, of the form sj : P2
j → Pj.A n d t h e r e i s n o l o s s
of generality in considering second stage election strategies independent on ﬁrst
stage loser’s campaign, which is r2j : P2
j × Pj × P →
©
0, 1
2,1
ª
.
6A belief at the ﬁrst election about candidates is a function µ1 from the
cartesian product of campaign messages PL ×PR to the set of joint probability
distributions on P2. A belief at the second election is a function µ2 from the
cartesian product of campaign messages, ﬁrst stage voting outcomes, and policy
outcomes to the set of joint probability distributions on P2.
Deﬁnition 1 An electoral equilibrium consists of strategies (mj,s j), (r1j,r 2j)
and beliefs (µ1,µ 2) such that for j,k = R,L, j 6= k
(1) mj(α) maximizes in m
Z
Pk
Z
[−D,D]
r1j(m,mk(β),x)
£
y − k(α − sj(α)2¤
f(β)g(x)dβdx +
Z
Pk
Z
[−D,D]2
r1j(m,mk(β),x 1)r2j(m1,s j(α),x 2)δyf(β)g(x1)g(x2)dβdx1dx2
for all α ∈ Pj
(2) sj(α,m) maximizes in sj ∈ Pj
−k(α − sj)2 +
Z
[−D,D]
r2j(m(α),s j,x))δyg(x)dx
for all (α,m) ∈ P2
j
(3) r1j(mR,m L,x)=1if E
£
(x − sj(·))2 | mR,m L
¤
<E
£
(x − sk(·))2 | mR,m L
¤
r1(mR,m L,x)=1
2 if E
£
(x − sj(·))2 | mR,m L
¤
= E
£
(x − sk(·))2 | mR,m L
¤
r1(mR,m L,x)=0if E
£
(x − sj(·))2 | mR,m L
¤
>E
£
(x − sk(·))2 | mR,m L
¤
for all (mR,m L,x) ∈ PR × PL × PL. Expectations are taken with respect to µ1
(4) r2j(m,s,x)=1if E
£
(x − αj)2 | mR,s
¤
<E
£
(x − αk)2¤
r2j(m,s,x)=1
2 if E
£
(x − αj)2 | mR,s
¤
= E
£
(x − αk)2¤
r2j(m,s,x)=0if E
£
(x − αj)2 | mR,s
¤
>E
£
(x − αk)2¤
for all (m,s,x) ∈ P2
j × P. Expectations are taken with respect to µ2
(5) Expectations are computed using Bayes’ rule whenever possible
Conditions (1) and (2) say that each candidate’s electoral and policy strate-
gies are sequentially optimal given her opponent’s strategies and voters’ decision.
Conditions (3) and (4) say that voters’ decisions are optimal at each election,
given their beliefs.
Deﬁnition 2 An electoral equilibrium is symmetric whenever (mR(α),s R(α)) =
−(mL(−α),s L(−α)) for all α ∈ [0,D]
7Set π1R(mR,m L(·)) =
Z
[−D,D]2
Z
PL
r1(mR,m L(β),x)f(β)g(x)dβdx
Set π2R(mR,s)=
Z
[−D,D]
Z
PL
r21(m,s,x)g(x)dx
and deﬁne analogous quantities for candidate L. π1R and π2R represent candi-
date R’ probabilities of winning the ﬁrst and the second election, respectively.
Let µ2R (α,·|m,s) be the marginal distribution of R0s type induced by
message m and policy s.
Candidate R’s payoﬀ is π1R(mR,m L(·))(U(s,α)+π2(mR,s)δy).
An electoral pool is a set Ω ⊂ [−D,D] such that, for some m ∈ [−D,D],
mR(α)=m or mL(α)=m for all α ∈ Ω.
A policy pool is a set Ω ⊂ [−D,D] such that, for some s ∈ [−D,D], sR(α)=s
or sL(α)=s for all α ∈ Ω.
Deﬁnition 3 An electoral equilibrium is monotonic if
(1R) π1R(mR(α),m L(·)) and π2R(mR(α),s(α)) a r ed e c r e a s i n go n[0,D],a n d
sR (m(α),α) is increasing on [0,D]6
(1L) π1R(mR(·),m L(α)) and π2R(mR(α),s(α)) is increasing on [−D,0], sL (m(α),α)
is decreasing on [−D,0]
In words an equilibrium is monotonic if more centrists candidates have higher
probabilities of being elected, and implement more centrist policies. We impose
monotonicity only on equilibrium messages. The following Remark points out
the strict relation the connectivity properties. of monotone equilibria.
Remark 3 From the deﬁnition of monotonic equilibrium it follows that, at equi-
librium:
(1) For all m ∈ [0,D], Ω(m)={α : m(α)=m} is connected
(2) For all m,s ∈ [0,D], Ω(m,s)={α : s(m,α)=s} is connected. In particular
for each α Ω(m(α),s(α)) are connected.
(3) If s(m(α),α)=s(m(α0),α 0) then π1(α)=π1R(α0) and π2(α)=π2R(α0).
There is no loss of generality in assuming that candidates having the same prob-
ability of election at the ﬁrst stage use the same electoral campaign (we assume
candidates only use pure strategies) (3) can be written as
(4) s(m(α),α)=s(m(α0),α 0) ⇒ m(α)=m(α0).
Electoral and policy pools are connected in monotonic equilibria. So monotonic-
ity helps to get rid of very unlikely equilibria. For instance situations in which
centrists and moderates present diﬀerent electoral platforms, but extremists
pool with centrists. Furthermore monotonic equilibria have an intuitive appeal
in our setup in which median voter’s distribution is symmetric around the ori-
gin.
6For decreasing/increasing we mean weakly decreasing/increasing, otherwise we will say
strictly decreasing/increasing.
8All along the paper we will devote our attention to symmetric monotonic equilib-
ria. Then in the analysis it suﬃces to consider only one of the two candidates.
We will analyze R strategies omitting the subscript R, when there is no risk
of ambiguity. At the same time we will use s(α) for s(m(α),α), π1(α) for
π1(mR(α),m L(·)) and π2(α) for π2(m(α),s(α)).
3 Preliminary results on monotonic equilibria
The ﬁrst result provide an additional reason that makes of monotonic equilib-
rium a reasonable choice in this environment. Each electoral equilibrium is,
locally, monotonic. In any electoral pool equilibrium policies are monotonic and
second stage election probabilities are decreasing.
Lemma 1 Let m ∈ P be a campaign message. Then in any symmetric equi-
librium.
(i) s(α,m),i si n c r e a s i n go nΩ(m).
(ii) π2(m,s(α)) is decreasing on Ω(m)7.
Symmetric claims hold for candidate L.
It follows
Corollary 1 In any non monotonic equilibrium the electoral campaign is mean-
ingful.
The next result shows that, in any monotonic equilibrium, after a policy
pool there will be a set of unused policies. We will make frequent use of it. In
particular it implies that after a policy pool the policy function has a disconti-
nuity.
Lemma 2 Let s be equilibrium policy strategies and let α1 <α 2 and assume
s(α)=s for all s ∈ (α1,α 2) then there exists h>0 such that policies in
(s,s + h) are not used.
In any equilibrium some candidate lies and imitates the policy implemented
by a more centrist politician in order to increase her probability of winning the
elections. As Corollary it follows that no separating equilibrium exists
Lemma 3 In a monotonic equilibrium, if s(α) is separating in [α1,α 2) then
s(α) 6= α on [α1,α 2).M o r es(α) <αon [α1,α 2).
Proposition 4 There is no policy separating monotonic equilibrium. Then
there is no full separating equilibrium.
7Property (i) holds in any electoral equilibrium, either symmetric or asymmetric as follows
from the proof of the result.
9Proof. Otherwise, from Lemma 3 s(0) > 0.B u t t h e n t y p e s(0) > 0 could
proﬁtably deviate by imitating 0, because it would increase her election prob-
abilities and would save her policy costs, a contradiction. Any full separating
equilibrium is equivalent to a monotonic equilibrium so the second claim follow
from the ﬁrst.
4T h e M D 1 r e ﬁnement
In this section we present an equilibrium reﬁnement, introduced by Bernheim
and Severinov (2003) and studied also in Kartik (2005) for cheap talk extensions
of one round signalling games. Diﬀerently from Kartik (2005) in our model there
are two senders and receiver’s type is unknown. Furthermore cheap talk and
costly signalling are not simultaneous. We then adapt the reﬁnement to our
framework. The reﬁnement is applied only to policies that are never used in
equilibrium.
Before the MD1 criterion is deﬁned we present another piece of notation. We
will refer to the lower and highest probability of election, following a given policy
s. For all s ∈ [0,D]
set
πlR(s)= s u p
sR(α)>s
π2R(α),i fsR (α) >sfor some α ∈ [0,D]
πlR(s)=π2R(D,f(·)) otherwise
and
πhR(s)= i n f
sR(α)<s
π2R(α),i fsR (α) <sfor some α ∈ [0,D]
πhR(s)=π(0,f(·)) otherwise
Analogous quantities are deﬁned for candidate L.
Deﬁnition 4 An electoral equilibrium satisﬁes the monotonic D1 (MD1)
criterion if
(1) It is monotonic
(2) For all m =( mR(βR),m L(βL)) and all s ∈ [0,D] with µ(s | βR,βL)=0
for all (βR,βL) ∈ PR × PL. If there exists a non-empty set of types Ω ⊂ [0,D]
such that, for each α/ ∈ Ω,i ft h e r ee x i s t ss o m eα0 ∈ Ω such that for all π ∈
[πlR(s),πhR(s)]
π1R(β)
¡
y − k(s − α)2 + πδy
¢
≥ π1R(α)
¡
y − k(sR(α) − α)2 + π2(α)δy
¢
π1R(β)
¡
(y − k(s − α0)2 + πδy
¢
>π 1R(α0)
¡
y − k(sR(α0) − α0)2 + π2(α0)δy
¢
(3) Ω is minimal with respect this property and µ(·,·|m,s)=µR(·)f(·),w h e r e
suppµR (·|m,s)) ⊂ Ω.
Analogous requirement is imposed for candidate L.
10I nt h ec a s ei nw h i c h[πlR(s),πhR(s)] is substituted by [π(D,f(·)),π(0,f(·))]
w ew o u l dh a v ea na d a p t a t i o nt oo u rs e t u po ft h eD 1c r i t e r i o ni n t r o d u c e db y
Cho and Kreps (1987). (2) extends the monotonicity requirements to out of
equilibrium beliefs. If an elected oﬃcial implements out of equilibrium policy
s, she should expect of being reelected with probability between πlR (s) and
πhR (s).T h e r e ﬁnement assign positive probability only to those types who
beneﬁtm o s tf r o mt h i sd e v i a t i o n .
5 Equilibrium characterization and existence
If s(·) is increasing then it has at most a countable set of discontinuity points
and it is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere (see Royden (1988)). There is no loss
of generality in assuming that electoral campaign is monotonic increasing and
that m(α)=α when type α is separating, and that agents having the same
probability of being elected at the ﬁrst election make the same announcement.
Let α1 <α 2 <. . .<α k < ...be s’s discontinuity points of sR.
Lemma 4 If, at equilibrium types in (αi,α i+1) a r ep o o l i n go nt h es a m ep o l i c y
then they sent the same campaign message8.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ α<α 0 <α 00. By contradiction assume some types in (α,α0) ⊂
(αi,α i+1) sending message m and let types in (α0,α 00) ⊂ (αi,α i+1) sending
message m0 Let α0 +ε imitate type α0 −ε. The gain in the probability of being
elected at the ﬁrst stage is bounded below by a strictly positive constant.The
gain in second election probability is non negative. For ε → 0 the loss in policy
term goes to 0 by continuity so the deviation would be proﬁtable for ε small
enough.
Observe that α =a r gm a x α0 π1(α0))
h
y − k(s(α0) − α)
2 + π2 (α0)δy
i
So almost everywhere.
π0
1(α)
h
y − k(s(α) − α)
2 + π2 (α)δy
i
+π1(α))[−2ks0(α))(s(α) − α)+π0
2 (α)δy]=0
(1)
If agents in (α0,α 00) pool on the same campaign and on the same policy the
inequality is 0=0 .
In particular, if all agents in (α0,α 00) pool on the same campaign but use
diﬀerent policies (π1(α)))
0 =0so that
[−2ks0(α))(s(α) − α)+π0
2 (α)δy]=0on (α0,α 00) (2)
Remark 5 If π1 and π2 are C1 and strictly decreasing both problems deﬁned
by the diﬀerential equations above and the terminal condition S(D)=D have
a unique solution such that s(α) <αon (D − ε,D) for arbitrary small ε. The
8Under the convention introduced in Remark 3
11result follows from Lemma 5 in the Appendix (see also Kartik (2005). Such
solution is such that s(α) <αon (0,D).F u r t h e r m o r e s(0) < 0, because if s
crossed the diagonal s0 →∞ . This is impossible: if the graph cross the diagonal
it must be from below because s(α) <αon (0,D).
Set for all α,α0 such that, m(α)=m(α0) and all π,s e t
T(α,β,s,π2)=π1(β)
¡
y − k(s − α)2 + π2δy
¢
−π1(α)
¡
y − k(s(α) − α)2 + π2 (α)δy
¢
Remark 6 C o n d i t i o n( 2 )c a nb ew r i t t e ni nt h i sc a s ea s
For all m =( mR(βR),m L(βL)) and all s ∈ [0,D] with µ(s | βR,βL)=0for all
(βR,βL) ∈ PR×PL. If there exists a non-empty set of types Ω ⊂ [0,D] such that,
for each α/ ∈ Ω,i ft h e r ee x i s t ss o m eα0 ∈ Ω such that for all π ∈ [πl(s),πh(s)]
T(α,β,s,π2) ≥ 0= ⇒ T(α0,β,s,π2) > 0
Ω is minimal with respect this property and µ(·,·|m,s)=µR(·)f(·),w h e r e
suppµR (·|m,s)) ⊂ Ω.
When there is no risk of ambiguity we will write about β,s,π2 we will write
T (α) for T(α,β,s,π2) and T0 (α) for T1(α,β,s,π2).
From Equation 1 it follows that
T0 (α)=2 k[π1(α)(α − s(α)) − π1(β)(α − s)] (3)
Any monotonic D1 equilibrium is characterized by a cutoﬀ type that divides
pooling from separating types.
Proposition 7 Any symmetric monotonic D1 is essentially equivalent to an
equilibrium in which, for all i there exists α∗ ∈ (0,D] such that
(1) sR(α)=0on [0,α ∗]
(2) If α∗ <Dthen sR(α) is separating on (α∗,D] and sR(D)=D.
Actually we can go further and characterize fully all monotonic D1 equilibria.
We can divide the them in four categories:
(i) fully pooling equilibria in which all types pool in campaign and policy
(ii) campaign irrelevant but policy signiﬁcative equilibria, in which all
types send the same electoral message, but the more extremist types separate
in policy
(iii) weakly expressive campaign equilibria in which centrists and extremists
form diﬀerent campaign pools but extremists separate in policy
(iv) expressive campaign equilibria where centrists pool on the same electoral
promise and on the same policy and extremists separate both in campaign and
in policy
The larger is k, the larger are the possibilities of relevant electoral campaign.
The expressive campaign equilibria asymptotically converge to a fully separating
equilibrium, in which electoral promises are maintained.
12Theorem 8 There exist k0 <k 1 <k 2 and strictly decreasing functions α1 (k),α 2 (k),α 3(k)
with limk→∞ αi(k)=0for i =1 ,2,3,s u c ht h a t
(i) If k ≤ k0 there are only fully pooling equilibrium in which m(α)=m(0)
and s(α)=0for all α ∈ [0,D].I fk>k 0 such an equilibrium is not MD1
(ii) For k0 ≤ k there exists a campaign irrelevant but policy signiﬁcative
M D 1e q u i l i b r i as u c ht h a tm(α)=m(0) for all for all α ∈ [0,D], s(α)=0
α ∈ [0,α 1(k)], s(α) is separating on (α(k),D]
(iii) k1 ≤ k there exists a weakly expressive campaign equilibrium in which
m(α)=m(0) for all α ∈ [0,α 2(k)] and m(α)=m0 for α ∈ [α2(k),D]. s(α)=0
for α ∈ [0,α 2(k)] and s(α) is separating on (α2(k),D].
(iv) k2 ≤ k there exists a expressive campaign equilibrium in which m(α)=
m(0) for all α ∈ [0,α 3(k)] and m(α)=α for α ∈ [α3(k),D]. s(α)=0for
α ∈ [0,α 2(k)] and s(α) is separating on (α3(k),D].
Any symmetric MD1 equilibrium is essentially equivalent with one of the equi-
libria described above.
The existence part of Theorem 8 relies on the possibilities of threatening
the incumbent of not conﬁrming her in oﬃce if she shirks. It requires beliefs
to be correlated outside of the equilibrium path9. It is like electors, when
deceptioned by elected oﬃcials had doubt on optimality of their past actions
and were seriously tempted to give rationally the support to the challenger. If
they was wrong about one candidate why should not they be wrong about the
other one, too?
In any case in the real world electoral disappointment does have an eﬀect
on electors. The model we presented does not capture this aspect because
the idiosyncratic shocks deﬁning median voter exact position is independent
across periods and uncorrelated to actions. But electoral disappointment can
be introduced as a shift of voters distribution, correlated with the degree of
electoral fulﬁllment. To make things simple as possible assume that median
voter distribution is shifted to left in the case of an R incumbent, or to the
right in the case of an L incumbent of a ﬁxf a c t o rx>0, if the elected oﬃcer
deviates from the expected policy(ies)10. The reader can easily verify that the
claim of Theorem 8 holds even if we impose electors’ beliefs about the two
candidates to be independent. More precisely, if x ≥ D −
D2−
R D
0 βf(β)dβ
D+
R D
0 βf(β)dβ the
k0,k 1,k 2 found in the proof of the result would stay the same11.O t h e r w i s e
their value would be larger as it would harder to induce extremists not to pool
in campaign We conjecture that a similar result can be obtained also through
a shock which is continuously dependent from the distance between expected
policy and implemented one.
The MD1 reﬁnement applies only to zero probabilities policies . It is strong
9Which is allowed by our deﬁnition of equilibrium.
10Excluding the case of a totally out of equilibrium policy, which deﬁnes the MD1 criterion.
11 D2−
R D
0 βf(β)dβ
D+
R D
0 βf(β)dβ is the minimal displacement that makes the median never voting D
against a challenger randomly drawn from FL,
13enough to shrink down dramatically the set of possible equilibria. The key, as for
Universal Divinity, is that we ask the support of the distribution to be minimal.
If the function T has a a unique maximizer, α, then to such maximizer must be
given probability one. Like in Banks (1990), this leads to equilibria characterized
by a unique cutoﬀ type. Dropping the minimality requirement would allow for
a very large set of electoral equilibria even with expressive electoral promises.
Consider the following case in which types in (αi,α i+1) are pooling on policy
s (or they are separating) and the jump of the policy function is h.I f t h e
minimality requirement is dropped this is compatible with the support of median
voter’s beliefs being in whatever set containing αi+1. It is then compatible with
equilibria in which a centrist and an extremist pool exist while the other types
separate in campaign and in policy.
The claim of Proposition 4 relies on the boundedness of the type space.
Allowing for an unbounded type space can lead to full separation in sender-
receiver games with both costly messages and cheap talk (see Kartik (2005)).
It is not the case here. We would of course obtain full separation in policy,
but total pooling in campaign. The reason is that, asymptotically, candidates
utilities is null, so it is the eﬀect of career concerns. Very extremist candidates
would be incomparably better oﬀ by maximizing their ﬁrst election probability.
Full separation could probably be obtained in the case in which candidates care
also about challengers’ implemented policy.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have presented a model of electoral competition under incomplete informa-
tion in which candidates care both about oﬃce and the policy. Introducing
incomplete information and the dynamic aspects of a double election we have
proved that electoral campaign is able to convey relevant information to voters
even if it is not costly. In this direction we open a possibility for endogenous
commitment of policy innovating on Harrington (1992a). The result is driven
both on candidates’ career concern and then the threat of failed reelection and
the impossibility for candidates to sustain policies that are too faraway from
their ideal ones. Extending Harrington (1993a) we ﬁnd that not only reelection
pressure but also policy motivation can give relevance to electoral promises. De-
spite of it we also proved that centrist electoral opportunism cannot be totally
eliminated, but only reduced if candidates’ degree of policy implication is high
enough This is consistent with the empirical literature which estimates that only
a part (even if relevant) of policies are responsive to electoral compromises.
The investigation can be extended in diﬀerent directions. On the one hand
toward the study of more complex models of competition. In our model the
“world ends” after the second election. So just before it there is no place for
meaningful electoral competition. Allowing for repeated interactions should
make it relevant. An appropriate and realistic simple model would be the one
of an overlapping generation of politicians that can stay in the oﬃce for a ﬁxed
number of terms. In this case challengers’ campaign would be relevant. The
14threat to reelection imposed on the incumbent would be reinforced, and so the
degree of commitment.
A partially unexplored ﬁeld is about the nature itself of electoral campaign.
It is usually modeled as a one-shot policy announcement (either costly or cheap).
Despite of it electoral campaign are, in the real world repeated and longer
interactions between electors and politicians. A lot of announcements are made,
a lot of resources are devoted to test electors intentions and tastes through pools
(see for instance Alvarez (1998)). It is probably the case that this matters a lot
in the process of information transmission in two directions: parties both try to
produce reliable information and at the same time the try to get information
about electors. Actually it has been shown (see Krishna and Morgan (2004))
that repeated cheap talk iteration (conversation) extends the set of equilibria of
the Crawford-Sobel model.
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7.1 Section 3
P r o o fo fL e m m a1Let 0 ≤ α<α 0.S e t s = s(α,m), s0 = s(α0,m), π2 =
π2(m,s(α,m)) and π0
2 = π0
2(m,s1(α0,m).
(i) By contradiction let s0 <s .. From incentive compatibility it follows
−k(s − α)2 + π2δy ≥− k(s0 − α)2 + π0
2δy
−k(s − α0)2 + π0
2δy ≥− k(s − α0)2 + π2δy
Which is
(π2 − π0
2)δy + k
£
(s0 − α)2 − (s − α)2¤
≥ 0
(π0
2 − π2)δy + k
£
(s − α0)2 − (s0 − α0)02¤
≥ 0
Summing up the two inequalities
(s0 − α)2 − (s − α)2 +( s − α0)2 − (s0 − α0) ≥ 0
With elementary algebra
(α − α0)(s − s0) ≥ 0
The claim follows as α<α 0.
(ii) By contradiction let π2 >π 0
2Assume that it is not the case. From (i)
and the deﬁnition of monotonic equilibrium it follows that it cannot be
t h ec a s et h a tα and α0 separate or that α and α0 pool or that α0 pools
with some other type and α separate. It must be the case that α pools
and α0 separates. But then from Remark Connectivity the pool α belongs
to is an interval (α1,α 2).I ns u c hac a s et h ed e c i s i v em e d i a nv o t e ro fα is
e(α)=1
2
R α2
α10 β2f(β)dβ−(F(α2)−F(α1))
R D
0 β2f(β)dβ
R α2
α1 βf(β)dβ+(F(α2)−F(α1))
R D
0 βf(β)dβ while the decisive median
voter of α0 >αis e(α0)=1
2
(α0)
2
−
R D
0 β2f(β)dβ
α0+
R D
0 βf(β)dβ >e(α), a contradiction.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2From Remark 3 (30) m(α)=m on (α1,α 2). There is no
loss of generality in assuming that (α1,α 2) ⊂ Ω(m,s) ⊂ [α1,α 2]. We will
write s From monotonicity s(α2) ≥ s.
Consider ﬁrst the case s(α2) >s . Then policies in (s,s(α2)) are not used
in equilibrium.
Now let s(α2)=s and set b s = lim α&α2s(α)=i n fα>α2s(α).O b s e r v e
that s(α) >sfor α>α 2. By contradiction let b s = s.S e tπ1ε = π1(α2+ε),
π1 = π10, π2ε = π2Rα2 + ε), π2 = π20.I tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tπ2ε <π 2
and 0 <π 1ε ≤ π1for all ε>0.F r o m R e m a r k π2 − π2ε is bounded
below by some positive constant c.F u r t h e r m o r e(s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε))
2 >
(s − α2 − ε)
2 for all ε>0 Otherwise α2 + ε could proﬁtably deviate by
mimicking α2.
17L(ε) is the net loss or the net gain to type α2 +ε from imitating type α2.
As it is an equilibrium L(ε) ≤ 0 for all ε>0.
For all 0 <ε<ε ∗ set
L(ε)=π1
³
y − k(s − α2 − ε)
2 + π2δy
´
−
π1ε
n
y − k[s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε)]
2 + π2εδy
o
L(ε) is the net loss or the net gain to type α2 +ε from imitating type α2.
As it is an equilibrium L(ε) ≤ 0 for all ε>0.
L(ε) ≥ π1k
h
(s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε))
2 − (s − α2 − ε)
2
i
+π1ε∗(π2−π2ε)δy ≥
π1k
h
(s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε))
2 − (s − α2 − ε)
2
i
+ π1ε∗cδy.
infε>0 π1k
h
(s(α2 + ε) − (α2 + ε))
2 − (s − α2 − ε)
2
i
=0 ,t h e nf o rε small
enough L(ε) > 0, a contradiction.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3By contradiction let s(b α)=b α for some b α ∈ (α1,α 2).L e t
ε ≥ 0 and set π1ε = π1 (b α + ε,), π1 = π1, π2ε = π2R (b α + ε) π2 = π20.A s
s is strictly strictly increasing π2ε <π 2 and π1ε ≤ π1for all ε>0.S e t
L(ε) be the net loss or the net gain to type b α + ε from imitating type b α.
As it is an equilibrium L(ε) ≤ 0 for all ε>0.
L(ε)=π1
¡
y − kε2 + π2δy
¢
− π1ε
n
y − k[s(b α + ε) − (b α + ε)]
2 + π2εδy
o
L(ε) ≥ π1
¡
y − kε2 + π2δy
¢
−π1ε {y + π2εδy} ≥ π1ε∗
£
−kε2 +( π2 − π2ε)δy
¤
,
for some ﬁxed ε∗ > 0. π1ε∗ > 0 and π2ε = π(b α + ε,f(·)).
Set B(ε)=π1ε∗
£
−kε2 +( π2 − π2ε)δy
¤
dB(ε)
dε = −π1ε∗
¡
2kε + dπ2ε
dε
¢
dB(ε)
dε |ε=0 = −π1ε∗
³
dπ(b α+ε,f(·))
dε |ε=0
´
> 0 from Remark 1. As B(0) = 0
then B(ε) > 0 for ε small enough. But then type b α + ε could proﬁtably
mimic type b α,f o rε small enough, yielding a contradiction.
By contradiction assume s(α) >α .C o n s i d e r t y p e α0 = s(α) >α .B y
monotonicity s(α0) >s(α) because agents in [α1,α 2) separate. But then
α0 can proﬁtably imitate α: the probabilities of election at both stages
increase (weakly) and she would not pay policy costs.
7.2 Section 5
Lemma 5 Let f be a negative C1 functions deﬁned on [0,D]×B where B is a
real interval such that .[0,D] $ B ⊂ (−∞,D].L e tf be negative on B..T h e n
there exists a solution, deﬁned on [0,D], to the following ordinary diﬀerential
equation problem:



y0 (x)(y − x)=f (x,y (x))
y(D)=D
y(x) ≤ x
.
If there exists δ>0 such that fy (x,y) ≥ 0( x,y) ∈ {(x,y) ∈ B : ||(x,y) − (D,D)|| <δ , y<x ,},
then the solution is unique.
Proof. The problem does not satisfy the local Lipschitz conditions in a neigh-
borhood of the origin. The existence part of the Proof is by approximation. Let
18yε be the solution of the following Cauchy problem ½
y0 (x)(y(x) − x)=f (x,y (x))
y(D)=D − ε
.Here the local existence and uniqueness theorem applies. For showing that
yε(x) can be extended to the interval [0,D] it suﬃces to show that there exists no
x∗ ∈ [0,D), such that limx→x∗ y0
ε(x)=∞. In this case classical extension theo-
rems apply. First observe that if yε is deﬁned and C1in the interval (x∗,D] from
yε(D)=D − ε and y0
ε (x)(yε (x) − x) < 0 follows y0
ε (x) > 0 and yε (x) <xon
(x∗,D].I flimx→x∗ y0
ε(x)=∞,t h e nyε(x) → x∗ for x → x∗. For small enough
δ>0 y0
ε (x) > 2 on (x∗,x ∗ + δ].T h e nl e t0 <δ
0
<δ . By the intermediate value
theorem yε (x∗ + δ)−(x∗ + δ)=yε
¡
x∗ + δ
0¢
−
¡
x∗ + δ
0¢
+y0
ε
¡
x∗ + δ
00¢³
δ − δ
0´
for for some δ
0 <δ
00 <δ .b u t t h e n yε (x∗ + δ) − (x∗ + δ) >y ε
¡
x∗ + δ
0¢
−
¡
x∗ + δ
0¢
+2
³
δ − δ
0´
.L e t δ
0 → 0. From the previous observations it follows
that the RHS converges to 2δ while the LHS is independent on δ
0 <δ .T h e n
yε (x∗ + δ) − (x∗ + δ) > 2δ>0, which yields a contradiction. yε (x) is C1
with respect to ε on [0,D) (Pontiriaguine (1969), ch. 23). yε (D) → D for
ε → 0.F u r t h e r m o r et h ef a m i l y{yε}ε>0 is uniformly bounded on each interval
[0,D− δ], 0 <δ<DIf yε (x) is not converging for ε → 0,f o rs o m ex ∈ [0,D)
Ascoli-Arzelá Theorem. does not apply for some interval [0,D− δ]. It follows
that supε>0 y0
ε = ∞. As above it follows that yε (x) >xfor some ε and some
x ∈ [0,D− δ], a contradiction. So yε converges uniformly to some y in each
interval [0,D− δ].e a c hyε y0 (x)(y(x) − x)=f (x,y (x)),s oy0
ε converges uni-
formly to some continuous z. From classical theorems on uniform convergence
then satisﬁes y0 = z. The local existence and uniqueness theorem implies that
y is independent on the choice of δ. y is deﬁned and diﬀerentiable on [0,D)
and satisﬁes.y0 (x)(y(x) − x)=f (x,y) because each yε satisﬁes it. y(x) <xon
[0,D) otherwise y0 (x) →∞for x → x∗,s o m ex∗ against the uniform conver-
gence of y0
ε. The existence part is the proved setting y(D)=l i m x→D y(x)=0 .
Now assume that f,g satisfy the local properties deﬁned in the claim is locally
decreasing as deﬁned in the claim. By contradiction assume that there are two
distinct solution, y and z of the problem. The local existence and uniqueness
theorem implies that the graphs of the function cross only at (D,D).T h e r e
is no loss of generality then in assuming that y(x) <z (x) on [0,D).T h e n
y0 (x) >z 0 (x) for x ∈ [D − δ,D) for 0 <δ<D , small enough. For x next to D,
we have z0 (x)(z (x) − x) ≥ y0 (x)(y(x) − x)=f (x,y (x)) ≥ f (x,z (x)) with at
least one strict inequality, a contradiction because z solves the ODE problem.
From Lemma 2 follows that if some types (α0,α 00) ⊂ (αi,α i+1) are in the
same policy pool then (αi,α i+1) is included in the same policy pool. So if (αi,α)
with α ≤ αi+1 are separating then types in (αi,α i+1) are all separating.
Lemma 6 In a symmetric MD1 equilibrium
(i) s(0) = 0
(ii) If types in (αi,α i+1) are in the same policy pool then agents in (αi+1,α i+2)
separate.
19(iii) If types in (αi,α 1+1) separate then αi+1 = D
(iv) s(D)=D
Proof. For i =1 ,...,.S e t si = limα%αi s(α) and set si = limα&αi s(α).
Set s0 =0 , s0 = s(0) sD = limα%D s(α) and set sD = s(D) ≤ D..By de-
ﬁnition si < si for i =1 ,2.. and s0 ≤ s0, sD ≤ sD. From equilibrium
monotonicity it follows that for all i =1 ,2..., s ∈
¡
si,si
¢
T1 (α,β,s,π) < 0
if α>α i and T1 (α,β,s,π) > 0 for α<α i. Then from Condition (2) µ(αi |
m(β),s)=1because T increases as α approaches αi.F o rs ∈
¡
s0,s0
¢
and α>0,
T1 (α,β,s,π) < 0 so µ(αi | m(β),s)=1 . Finally for all s ∈
¡
sD,sD
¢
∪ (sD,D),
T1 (α,β,s,π) > 0 then for all s ∈
¡
sD,sD
¢
∪ (sD,D), µ(D | m(β),s)=1 .
(i) By contradiction let s(0) > 0. From the result above, for ε small enough
µ(0 | m(0),ε)=1 .t h e nε can proﬁtably deviate by sending (m(0),ε).
(ii) Let s∗ = s(α) for all α ∈ (αi,α i+1).. If agents in (αi+1,α i+2) are pooling
then, for ε small enough αi+1+ε can proﬁtably deviate by implementing policy
si − δ,w i t hδ small enough. µ(αi+1 | m(αi+1 + ε),si − δ)=1The loss in
policy term is inﬁnitesimal by continuity of s on (αi+1,α i+2), the gain in second
election probability is bounded below by a positive constant. agent.
(iii) If types in (αi,α i+1) are separating and types in (αi+1,α i+2) are pool-
ing then type αi+1 + ε can proﬁtably deviate by sending (m(αi+1 − ε),si − δ).
µ(αi+1 | (m(αi+1 − ε),si − δ)) = 1.F o rδ small enough, the loss in policy term
is compensated by the gain in election probability. If types in (α,αi+1) are pool-
ing then, for ε small enough αi+1 + ε can proﬁtably deviate by implementing
policy si − δ,w i t hδ small enough. µ(αi+1 | m(αi+1 + ε),si − δ)=1The loss
in policy term is of order δ
2, the gain in second election probability is bounded
below by a positive constant.
(iv) If s(D) <D ,f o r,µ(D | m(D),D)=1 , because for all s ∈ (s(D),D) has
a maximum between s and D Then D can proﬁtably deviate by implementing
policy D − ε,w i t hε<D− s(D).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7It suﬃces to show that α∗ > 0.I fα∗ =0 , then there
would be an MD1 equilibrium with separating policies against Proposition
4
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m8We will always assume that whenever beliefs are not
imposed by Bayesian consistency or by the monotonic D1 reﬁnement if a
candidate announce a policy and implement a diﬀerent equilibrium policy
then the median voter will not conﬁrm her. This is consistent as we allow
beliefs to be correlated. Let’s consider the diﬀerent possibilities.
(a) The ﬁrst one is that α∗ = D so that the equilibrium is equivalent to an
equilibrium in which all types are pooling together at 0 a and and at both
stages they are elected with probability 1
2, and after the the ﬁrst election all
pool on policy 0. The payoﬀ for type α is 1
2
£¡
1+δ
2
¢
y − kα2¤
.T h i si sa n
MD1 equilibrium if and only if 1
2
£¡
1+δ
2
¢
y − kD2¤
≥ 1
2y and δ
2y−kD2 ≥
δyπ2 (D),o t h e r w i s et y p eD could proﬁtably separate by implementing
20policy D (at the campaign and at the policy stage respectively 12)w h i c h
is as far as
k ≤ min
½
yδ
2D2,yδ
µ
1
2
− π2 (D)
¶¾
= yδ
µ
1
2
− π2 (D)
¶
= k0
where π2 (D) is the probability a candidate is elected at the second stage
if perceived as type D and the other candidate is selected from FL,w h i c h
is with probability
h
1 − G
³
1
2
D2−
R D
0 β2f(β)dβ
D+
R D
0 βf(β)dβ
´i
< 1
2, because of the sym-
metry of G.F o rk<k 0 a (continuous of) pooling equilibrium exists but
it does not satisﬁes the MD1 criterion.
(b) The possibility is that α∗ <D , and all types pool at the ﬁrst stage.
In such a case all types are elected with probability 1
2 at the ﬁrst election.
At the second stage type α ∈ [0,α ∗] is elected with probability
π2 ([0,α ∗]) = [1 − G(e([0,α ∗],f(·)))]
where
e([0,α ∗],f(·)) =
1
2
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ − F(α∗)
R D
0 β
2f (β)dβ
R α∗
0 βf (β)dβ + F(α∗)
R D
0 βf (β)dβ
is the decisive voter when the types in [0,α ∗] are pooling and matched to
a challenger selected from FL on [−D,0]. Elementary analysis shows that
−D<e ([0,α ∗],f(·)) <Dfor α∗ > 0 and e([0,α],f(·)) it is strictly
increasing. Furthermore limα∗→0+ e([0,α ∗],f(·)) = −1
2
R D
0 β2f(β)dβ
R D
0 βf(β)dβ ∈
[−D,0]. limα∗→D− e([0,α ∗],f(·)) = 0.S o π2 (α) is strictly decreasing
and diﬀerentiable in α.
On the other side, a type α ∈ (α∗,D] is elected at the second stage with
probability
π2 (α)=1− G(e(α,f (·)))
where
e(α,f (·)) =
1
2
α2 −
R D
0 β
2f (β)dβ
α +
R D
0 βf (β)dβ
We have −D<e([0,α ∗],f(·)) <e(α,f (·)) <D .S oπ2 (α) <π 2 ([0,α ∗]).
for α>α ∗. e(α,f (·)) is strictly increasing on (α∗,D]. limα∗→D− e(α,f (·)) =
1
2
D2−
R D
0 β2f(β)dβ
D+
R D
0 βf(β)dβ ∈ (0,D) because So π2 (α) is strictly decreasing and con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable in α∗.
If s(α) is separating on (α∗,D] t h ei tm u s ts a t i s f y
2ks0(α))(s(α) − α)=π0
2 (α)δy
12See the proof of Proposition 7 above.
21with the ﬁnal condition s(D)=D.F u r t h e r m o r eα∗ = α1(k) > 0 must be
indiﬀerent between separating and pooling, which is it must satisfy
µ
1
2
+ δπ2 ([0,α ∗])
¶
y − kα∗2 =
µ
1
2
+ δπ2 (α∗)
¶
y − k(s(α∗) − α∗)
2
Set H(α)=
¡1
2 + δπ2 ([0,α])
¢
y − kα2 −
¡1
2 + π2 (α)δ
¢
y + k(s(α) − α)
2.
s(0) < 0.S o H(0) > 0. H (D)=[ π2 ([0,D]) − π2 (D)]δy − kD2 = £1
2 − π2 (D)
¤
δy−kD2 ≤ 0 if k ≥ k0. H0 (α) < 0=
dπ2([0,α])
dα δy−2ks(α)13<
0. There exists a unique such α1(k) > 0. It is easily seen that s(α1(k)) > 0
because if s(α)=0then H(α) > 0.
Through implicit diﬀerentiation
dH(α1(k))
dk
= Hα(α1(k))
dα1(k)
dk
+ Hk(α1(k)) = 0
so,
dα1(k)
dk
=
−Hk(α1(k))
Hα(α1(k))
= −
s2 (α1(k)) − 2α1(k)s(α1(k))
dπ2([0,α1(k)])
dα δy − 2ks(α1(k))
< 0
Then α1(k) is strictly decreasing in k.
From H(α1(k)) = 0 follows α1(k) → 0 as k →∞ .
(3) Another possibility is that there are two campaign pools [0,α ∗) and(α∗,D],
with the second separating in policies. [0,α ∗) types’ election probabilities
are
π1 ([0,α ∗]) =
1
2
F(α∗)+( 1− F(α∗))[1 − G(e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D]))]
and π2 ([0,α ∗)), respectively, where (e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D])) is the decisive
median voter of pool [0,α ∗) against pool (α∗,D]: her location is
1
2
(1 − F(α∗))
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ − F(α∗)
R D
α∗ β
2f (β)dβ
(1 − F(α∗))
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ + F(α∗)
R D
α∗ β
2f (β)dβ
1
2
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ − F(α∗)
R D
0 β
2f (β)dβ
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ + F(α∗)
hR D
α∗ β
2f (β)dβ −
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ
i
Observe that G(e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D])) ≤ 1
2, because e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D]) ≤ 0.
(α∗,D]’s election probabilities are
π1 ((α∗,D]) = (F(α∗))(1 − G(e((α∗,D],[0,α ∗)))) +
1
2
(1 − F(α∗))
and π2 (α), respectively, where
e((α∗,D],[0,α ∗)) =
1
2
F(α∗)
R D
α∗ β
2f (β)dβ − (1 − F(α∗))
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ
F(α∗)
R D
α∗ β
2f (β)dβ +( 1− F(α∗))
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ
13Because s solves the diﬀerential equation.
22From the symmetry of the distribution G, G(e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D])) = 1 −
G(e((α∗,D],[0,α ∗))) = 1 − G ≤ 1
2.s o
π1 ((α∗,D]) = (F(α∗))(G(e([0,α ∗),(α∗,D]))) +
1
2
(1 − F(α∗))
and π1 ([0,α ∗]) = π1 ((α∗,D])+ 1
2 −G(e((α∗,D],[0,α ∗))) ≥ π1 ((α∗,D]).
As above, on (α∗,D] s must satisfy
2ks0(α))(s(α) − α)=π0
2 (α)δy
and α∗ must satisfy
π1 [0,α ∗]
£
1+π2 ([0,α ∗])δy − kα∗2¤
=
π1 ((α∗,D])
h
1+π2 (α∗)δy − k(s(α∗) − α∗)
2
i
Set H(α,k)=
©
(π1 ([0,α ∗]) + δπ2 ([0,α ∗]))y − kα∗2ª
−
−
n
(π1 ((α∗,D]) + π2 (α∗)δ)y − k(s(α∗) − α∗)
2
o
As above it can be shown, that a unique solution to H(α2(k),k)=0ex-
ists if and only if H(D) > 0 which is if and only if k ≥ k∗
1 >k 0 where
H(D,k∗
1)=0 . α2(k) is strictly decreasing and α2(k) → 0 as k →∞ .
It must be checked that type D does not want to imitate type α2(k) in
the campaign and then implement D.w h i c hi s
π1 [0,α 2(k)]y ≤ π1 ((α2(k),D])[(1 + π2 (D))δy], or, equivalently 1
2−G−π1 (α2(k),D)π2 (D)δ ≤
0 but π1 (α2(k),D)=−F (α2(k))
¡1
2 − G
¢
+1
2 Then he condition is
¡1
2 − G
¢
(1 + F (α2(k))π2 (D)δ) ≤
π2(D)δ
2 . Consider the function R(α)=
¡1
2 − G(e([0,α),(α,D]))
¢
(1 + F (α)π2 (D)δ)−
π2(D)δ
2 . R(0) = −
π2(D)δ
2 < 0, R0 > 0.A s α2(k) & 0 as k →∞ ,t h e r e
exists a unique k∗ > 0 such that this kind of equilibrium exists only for
k ≥ k∗.S e tk1 =m a x{k∗,k∗
1}.
(d) The last possible case is that agents in [0,α ∗] pool in campaign and
policy, and agents in (α,D] separate in campaign and in message. Then
the probability of ﬁrst stage election election of types in in [0,α ∗] is
π1([0,α ∗]) =
1
2
F(α∗)+
Z D
α∗
[1 − G(e([0,α ∗],β))]f (β)dβ
where, for all α>α ∗
e([0,α ∗],α)=
1
2
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ − F(α∗)α2
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ + F(α∗)α
e([0,α ∗],α) < 0 as α>α ∗.S oG(e([0,α ∗],α)) < 1
2.
If α∗ <α<Dthen is separating in campaign D is elected with probability
π1(α)=F(α∗)(1− G(e(α,[0,α ∗]))) +
1
2
Z D
α∗
·
1 − G
µ
β + α
2
¶¸
f (β)dβ
23where
e(α,[0,α ∗]) =
1
2
F(α∗)α2 −
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ
R α∗
0 β
2f (β)dβ + F(α∗)α
= −e([0,α ∗],α)
So G(e(α,[0,α ∗])) = 1
2 + G(e([0,α ∗],))
We can write
π1([0,α ∗]) =
1
2
F(α∗)+
Z D
α∗
·
3
2
− G(β,e([0,α ∗]))
¸
f (β)dβ =
3
2
− F(α∗) −
Z D
α∗
[G(β,e([0,α ∗]))]f (β)dβ
Now s must satisfy the diﬀerential equation
π0
1(α)
h
y − k(s(α) − α)
2 + π2 (α)δy
i
+
π1(α))[−2ks0(α))(s(α) − α)+π0
2 (α)δy]=0
And α∗ = α3 (k) has to satisfy π1 ([0,α ∗])
£
1+π2 ([0,α ∗])δy − kα∗2¤
=
π1 (α∗)
h
1+π2 (α∗)δy − k(s(α∗) − α∗)
2
i
Exactly as above one can prove the existence and uniqueness of α3 (k) and
of k2 such that the strategies are an equilibrium iﬀ k ≥ k2.
24